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to apply the antitrust laws 'prudently and 
with sensitivity,' with a 'special solici-
tude for the First Amendment rights' of 
[the SCfLA)." Id. (quoting Superior 
Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n. v. F. T. C, 856 
F.2d at 233-34). Thus, the court of ap-
peals shifted the burden to the FfC to 
show that the boycotters possessed suf-
ficient market power to warrant a per se 
violation of the antitrust laws. 
The Supreme Court, however, found 
the court of appeals' analysis to have 
been critically flawed in two respects. 
First, the court of appeals exaggerated 
the significance of the expressive com-
ponent in the SCfLA's boycott. The 
Court found nothing unique about the 
expressive component of the SCfLA boy-
cott. Rather, a rule that would require the 
courts to apply the antitrust laws with 
prudence and sensitivity whenever a 
boycott had an expressive component 
"would create a gaping hole in the fabric 
of those laws." Id. at 780. 
Second, the Court found that the court 
of appeals was incorrect in their assess-
ment of the antitrust laws. Id. at 779. The 
Court criticized the court of appeals' as-
sumption that the per se rule against 
price-fIXing and boycotts "is only a rule 
of 'administrative convenience and effi-
ciency,' and not a statutory command." 
Id. at 780. While the Court conceded that 
the per se rules of liability were in part 
justified by administrative convenience, 
the per se rules "reflect a long-standing 
judgment that the prohibited practices 
by their nature have a 'substantial poten-
tial for impact on competition.'" Id. 
(quotingjefferson Parish Hospital Dis-
trictNo.2v.Hyde, 466 U.S. 2,16(1984)). 
As Justice Douglas stated in a footnote to 
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 
310 U.S. 150 (1940), "whatever eco-
nomic justifications particular price-fix-
ing agreements may be thought to have, 
the law does not permit an inquiry into 
their reasonableness. They are all banned 
because of their actual or potential threat 
to the central nervous system of the econ-
omy." F. T. C 110 S. Ct. at 781-82 (quoting 
Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 225-26. 
The Court also conceded that some 
boycotts and some price-fIXing agree-
ments were more injurious to competi-
tion than others, but held that the court 
of appeals' assumption that absent proof 
of market power the SCfLA boycott was 
harmless, was inconsistent with the 
course of the Supreme Court's antitrust 
jurisprudence.Id. at782. Here, there was 
sufficient testimony to demonstrate that 
the boycott produced a crisis in the 
District's criminal justice system which 
achieved the SCfLA's economic goal. 
Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the 
court of appeals' decision creating an 
exception to the per se rules of antitrust 
liability. Id. 
The impact of this decision is substan-
tial. Previously, the notion of a boycott 
had been an agreement among the par-
ticipants to refrain from engaging in cer-
tain activities in order to bring about a 
change. It was thought that this type of 
agreement was protected by the first 
amendment because it was a form of 
expression. Now, if such an agreement 
has the objective of bringing about an 
economic benefit to the participants, the 
courts must characterize the agreement 
as a restraint of trade. The courts are then 
required to apply the per se rules of 
antitrust liability to the agreement and 
find it violative of both the Sherman Act 
and the Federal Trade Commission Act. 
-Thomas J S. Waxter, III 
Needle v. White, Minde~ Clark & HiU: 
TRIAL COURT'S DEOSION TO 
SANCITON REVERSED AS CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS 
In Needle v. White, Minde4 Clarke & 
Hill, 81 Md. App. 463, 568 A.2d 856 
(1990), the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland held that the trial court's deci-
sion to impose over $143,000 in sanc-
tions, pursuant to Maryland Rule 1-341, 
was clearly erroneous. After reviewing all 
the evidence in the underlying suit, the 
court held that neither of the plaintiff's 
attorneys, nor their client, lacked the 
substantial justification required to bring 
suit, nor had they brought the suit in bad 
faith. An attorney need only bring forth a 
colorable claim to avoid the imposition 
of sanctions, while a court cannot use the 
benefit of hindsight to determine the 
claim's merits. 
After a thirteen-year term of employ-
ment, Carolyn Gerst was amicably termi-
nated from her position as a bookkeeper 
for the law firm of White , Mindel, Clarke 
and Hill. According to the firm, Gerst was 
discharged simply because a replace-
ment could do a better job. Yet her em-
ployers subsequently discovered, among 
other discrepancies, that approximately 
$203,000 had been withdrawn from one 
of the firm's accounts, coinciding with 
Gerst's fmal year of employment. Thus, 
the firm instructed John Foley, a member 
of the firm, to file a claim for reimburse-
ment with the insurance company with 
whom they maintained a $100,000 em-
ployee fidelity policy. The claim asserted 
that the loss resulted from dishonest or 
fraudulent acts by Gerst. Additionally, a 
complaint against Gerst was filed with 
the police, satisfying a condition of recov-
ery under the policy. The full $100,000 
was eventually remitted to the firm, 
while Gerst was charged with embezzle-
ment. 
At her criminal trial, Gerst alleged that 
she withdrew the cash at the request of 
Samuel Hill, a partner in the firm, and 
then turned the money over to him. This 
conflicted with Hill's testimony that 
withdrawals from the account were al-
lowed by internal paper transfer only, 
and denied ever authorizing cash with-
drawals or receiving any cash from Gerst. 
After a three-day jury trial, Gerst was 
acquitted. 
Thereafter, Gerst retained Howard J. 
Needle and Sarah C. King for an initial 
counsel fee, with additional fees on a 
contingency fee basis. A suit was subse-
quently initiated against White, Mindel, 
Clarke and Hill, as well as Hill and Foley 
personally, for, Ultimately, malicious 
prosecution and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. At the extensive hear-
ing on the defendant'S pre-trial motion 
for summary judgment, Gerst asserted 
that the initiation of criminal charges by 
the firm was motivated solely by the 
firm's efforts to collect on its employee 
fidelity insurance policy, and resulted in 
her emotional distress. Conversely, the 
defendants argued that Gerst instituted 
her civil action as retaliation for the crim-
inal charges filed against her. The motion 
was denied. 
The case proceeded to trial where the 
issues were whether the law firm insti-
tuted a criminal proceeding against Gerst 
without probable cause for a purpose 
other than bringing an offender to jus-
tice, and whether, as a result, Gerst suf-
fered emotional distress. Needle, 81 Md. 
App. 467, 568 A.2d at 858. Conflicting 
testimony was heard on the procedure of 
cash withdrawals and the ultimate desti-
nation of the funds in question. Defen-
dants renewed their motion for summary 
judgment at the close of Gerst's case and 
again at the conclusion of all the evi-
dence. The trial court denied the former 
and reserved ruling on the latter. 
The issues, including whether Gerst 
stole money from the defendants, were 
submitted to the jury. The jury decided 
that the defendants had a reasonable be-
lief that Gerst took the money and that 
they did not report the matter to the 
police with ill will or with a reckless 
disregard for the truth. Additionally, the 
jury found that Gerst suffered emotional 
distress due to the filing of the police 
report, but that it was not severe, and that 
Gerst did not steal the money. Id. at 468, 
568 A.2d at 858. Thus, a judgment was 
entered for the defendants. 
Immediately following the verdict, the 
court, sua sponte, scheduled a sanctions 
hearing on the issue of Maryland Rule 
1-341, Bad Faith - Unjustified Proceed-
ings. Id. Although having only allowed 
three business days in between, the court 
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denied Gerst, Needle and King's request 
for additional time to prepare and seek 
separate counsel. Needle and King ap-
peared at the hearing representing both 
themselves and Gerst. 
After conducting post-trial factfinding, 
the trial judge imposed monetary sanc-
tions of $121,369.14 upon Gerst and 
$21,748.00 upon Needle and King to be 
paid to the defendants. [d. at 465, 568 
A.2d at 857. In a 21-page Memorandum 
Opinion, the trial court stated that: 
[T]he court is clearly convinced that 
this suit was brought by the plaintiff 
because of her ill will and hostility 
toward [the defendants]. Further, 
that she felt that she had nothing to 
lose by bringing this suit but be-
lieved that if she were successful she 
could reap a windfall from the de-
fendants. This court finds as a fact 
that this suit was brought and con-
tinued in bad faith and without sub-
stantial justification. The plaintiff 
knew that this action was frivolous. 
In addition, this court is clearly con-
vinced that at the very latest, when 
the case was called for trial on Sep-
tember 6, 1988, the plaintiffs attor-
neys knew that there was no 
evidence to support the plaintiffs 
allegations. Further, they knew or 
reasonably should have known that 
there was no justification in contin-
uing this litigation and causing the 
defendants to incur additional de-
fense costs. 
Id. at 469, 568A.2dat859. On appeal, 
the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland 
limited its review to a single issue -
whether the trial court's decision was 
clearly erroneous. Id. at 470, 568 A.2d at 
859. 
The court began its analysis by discuss-
ing the objectives and dangers of Mary-
land Rule 1-341. The rule allows a trial 
court to impose sanctions for conduct in 
bad faith or without substantial justifica-
tion whether by maintaining or defend-
ing a proceeding. The offending party, 
the advising attorney, or both may be 
required to pay the adverse party's costs 
of the proceeding and any reasonable 
attorney's fees incurred. The objective: 
eliminating litigant or counsel abuses of 
the judicial process by initiating or con-
tinuing meritless claims. The dangers: 
the chilling effect on all the parties con-
cerned, as well as limiting free access to 
the courts, for colorable claims, without 
fear of penalty over and above defeat. Id. 
at 470, 568 A.2d at 859.Qo. 
The court noted that since the rule's 
adoption in 1984, it had been used fre-
quently, and in 1988 alone, had been 
addressed at the appellate level at least 
six different times. Of those cases, sanc-
tions were upheld only once where fraud . 
was clearly established, and once for lack 
of substantial justification where the ar-
guments asserted had been repeatedly 
rejected in previous cases. Id. at 471, 
568 A.2d at 860. 
The court then turned to Needle and 
King and the issue of substantial justifica-
tion grounded in questions of client cred-
ibility. The court noted that both 
attorneys testified that they believed in 
Gerst's protestations of innocence. "A 
subjective belief in one's client," the 
court stated, "standing alone, should not 
be a bar to the imposition of sanctions. 
Where that belief is supported by articu-
lated facts supporting the subjective 
opinion, however, the rule is otherwise." 
Id. at 473, 568 A.2d at 861. Moreover, the 
rule "does not and was never in-
tended ... to require an attorney to pass 
judgment on the credibility of his client 
under the threat of monetary sanction in 
the event that either a jury or judge ar-
rives at a different conclusion as to cred-
ibility." [d. 
Rather, the test in Maryland for 
whether substantial justification is estab-
lished is whether "the legal position 
taken by counsel is 'fairly debatable,'" 
and not "whether a court or jury later 
believes that the client lacks credibility." 
Id. (citing Newman v. ReiUy, 314 Md. 
364, 550 A.2d 959 (988); ABA Section 
of Litigation, Sanctions (2d Ed. 1988)). 
The federal courts, the court noted, 
adopted an even more stringent, objec-
tive standard where if the attorney could 
not form a reasonable belief as to the 
validity of what is asserted at trial, sanc-
tions would be imposed. Id. 
After reviewing the information avail-
able to the two attorneys, the conflicting 
testimony, and Gerst's acquittal, the 
court disagreed with the trial court's be-
lief that no supporting evidence existed 
as to their client's credibility. Rather, the 
court held that "by either an articulated 
subjective belief or by a more rigorous 
objective standard, Needle and King 
could not reasonably be held to have 
proceeded without substantial justifica-
tion." Id. 
Next, the court considered the trial 
court's charge of bad faith on the part of 
Needle and King in proceeding to trial. 
The court noted that although Maryland 
had yet to defme bad faith in terms of 
Rule 1-341, the Supreme Court had pre-
viously defined the term as actions main-
tained "vexatiously, wantonly or for 
oppressive reasons." Id. (quoting Road-
way Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 
(1980)). Cases addressing the issue in 
Maryland seemed to indicate that only 
"egregious behavior" would support 
such a holding. Id. at 474, 568 A.2d at 
861. Thus, the court held that in order to 
impose sanctions based upon bad faith, 
"clear evidence that the action [was] en-
tirely without color and taken for other 
improper purposes amounting to bad 
faith" was required, and that was not the 
case here. Id. 
The court then turned to the issue of 
the Gerst sanctions which the trial court 
imposed, making no distinction between 
her actions and those of her counsel's. Id. 
As for whether substantial justification 
existed, the court again turned to the 
"fairly debatable" test and stated that it 
was "an attorney's call" involving "analy-
sis of the legal arguments, theories of 
recovery, and other decisions requiring 
the expertise of trained professionals." 
Id. Thus, the court held that judicial 
review of the issue should focus on the 
actions of attorneys rather than their cli-
ents.Id. 
The court found that the charge of bad 
faith was the primary basis for sanction-
ing Gerst in that the trial court believed 
that Gerst felt she had "nothing to lose" 
in bringing the action, but might instead 
"reap a windfall from the defendants." Id. 
at 474-75,568 A.2d at 862. Furthermore, 
the trial court found that she had not 
suffiCiently proven either claim. Id. at 
475, 568 A.2d at 862. Yet the court of 
special appeals found that based on the 
evidence and conflicting testimony, a 
prima facie case was raised for both ma-
licious prosecution and intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress. Thus, the 
court concluded that whether the ele-
ments were proven was for a jury to 
decide.Id. 
Finally, the court addressed the trial 
court's role when determining sanctions 
and focused first on the use of judicial 
hindsight. Relying on cases which re-
versed decisions to sanction, the court 
stated that in Maryland, judicial hindsight 
may not be used to determine whether 
substantial justification exists. Id. at 476, 
568 A.2d 862.Q3. Moreover, a trial attor-
ney should not be required to act as a trier 
of fact or judge, but need only have a 
"reasonable basis for believing that a case 
will generate a factual issue for the fact-
finder at trial." Id. at 476, 568 A.2d 863. 
This reasoning was directly in line with 
the general principle that one need only 
assert a colorable claim to avoid the im-
pOSition of sanctions; an attorney must 
either make a good faith argument on the 
merits of the action, or support it by a 
good faith argument for an extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law. 
Id. at 477, 568 A.2d at 863. 
10 the instant case, the trial court had 
constructively denied appellees' motion 
for judgment three times, establishing 
that it had thrice recognized the exis-
tence of disputed questions of fact. It was 
2~The Law Forum /20.3 ----------------------------------
only after a verdict was returned that the 
trial court "exercising its perceived 
power to engage in judicial hindsight, 
stated that it should never have permit-
ted the case to continue and sua sponte 
embarked on the sanctions phase of the 
trial." Id. at 478, 568 A.2d at 863. 
Although the court conceded that jus-
tified sanctions could be imposed for 
conduct during the trial, such as dilatory 
tactics or abusive conduct, no such alle-
gations were ever made. Id. at 479,568 
A.2d at 864. Accordingly, the court held 
that because the evidence was suffi-
ciently debatable to deny motions 
throughout the trial, it was sufficient to 
justify Gerst in bringing and continuing 
her case. Id. Thus, the court of special 
appeals concluded that the trial court's 
decision was clearly erroneous. Id. at 
479-80, 568 A.2d at 864. 
In so ruling, the Court of Special Ap-
peals of Maryland once again clearly dis-
couraged the excessive use of Rule 1-341 
sanctions. Such use can only impose a 
chilling effect on a plaintiff's right to 
court access, while providing an uncer-
tain environment for attorneys to act. As 
the court opined, Rule 1-341 should only 
be used in the most extreme of instances 
when a claim is clearly meritless and 
intended to remedy only intentional mis-
conduct. 
- Vasiliki Papaioannou 
Pavelic & leFlore v. Marvel Entertain-
ment Group: SANCTIONS FOR VlOIA-
TIONOFHID~RurnOF~ 
PROCEDURE 11 ONLY APPLY TO 
TIlE INDIVIDUAL SIGNER 
In Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Enter-
tainment Group, 110 S. Ct. 456 (1989), 
the United States Supreme Court held 
that sanctions provided by Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 11 ("Rule 11") only 
applied to the attorney who signed a 
paper in violation of Rule 11, even if the 
attorney explicitly signed on behalf of his 
fIrm. 
On behalf of Northern ]. Calloway, 
attorney Ray 1. leFlore brought a willful 
copyright infringment claim in the 
United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York against Marvel 
Entertainment Group ("Marvel"). In an 
amended complaint, Calloway alleged 
that Marvel forged his signature. After 
initiation of the claim, leFlore formed the 
law partnership ofPavelic & leFlore with 
Radovan Pavelic. Several papers relying 
on the allegation of forgery were signed: 
"Pavelic & leFlore 
By /s/ Ray 1. leFlore 
(A Member of the Firm) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff. " 
Id. at 457. The district court found that 
these papers were in violation of Rule 11 
and imposed a sanction in the amount of 
$100,000 against Pavelic & leFlore. 
Upon a motion by Radovan Pavelic, the 
district court shifted half of the sanction 
from the fIrm to LeFlore, because the fum 
did not exist during the major part of the 
litigation. However, the district court re-
jected Pavelic's contention that Rule 11 
only empowered the court to impose the 
sanction upon LeFlore and not upon the 
fum. The Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit affIrmed the sanction. The Sec-
ond Circuit's decision directly conflicted 
with a Fifth Circuit holding that author-
ized Rule 11 sanctions against only the 
individual signers. Id. at 458 citing Rob-
inson v. National Cash Register Co., 808 
F.2d 1119, 1128-30 (1987)). 
Pavelic appealed to the United States 
Supreme Court and was granted certio-
rari. In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the 
Court agreed with the Fifth Circuit and 
reversed the Second Circuit. In interpre-
ting Rule 11, the Court relied on the plain 
meaning of the rule. Pavelic & LeFlore, 
110 S. Ct. at 458 (citing Walker v. Armco 
Steel Corp., 446U.S. 740, 750n.9(1980)). 
Where a pleading, motion, or other 
paper violates Rule 11, the rule requires 
the trial court to "impose upon the per-
son who signed it . . . an appropriate 
sanction." Id. The Court noted that if 
viewed in isolation, the phrase "person 
who signed" is ambiguous. Id. However, 
upon reading the phrase in the entire 
context of Rule 11, the Court reasoned 
that since Rule 11 begins "with a require-
ment of individual signature, and then 
proceed [s] to discuss the import and con-
sequences of signature, ... references to 
the signature in the later portions must 
reasonably be thought to connote the 
individual signer mentioned at the out-
set." Id. 
In rejecting Marvel's contention that 
the legal principles of partnership and 
agency should apply, the Court empha-
sized that Rule 11 established a duty that 
an attorney could not delegate. Id. at 459. 
The Court also held that although LeFlore 
explicitly signed on behalf of his fIrm, the 
sanction only applied to leFlore individ-
ually. The Court reasoned that a signature 
on behalf of a fum could not comply with 
the fIrst sentence of Rule 11, since it 
requires papers to be signed "by at least 
one attorney of record in the attorney's 
individual name." Id. The Court noted 
that in the past, the preferred practice for 
an attorney was to sign on his own behalf 
with the name of his fIrm beneath. Id. 
(citing Gavit, The New FederalRules and 
State Procedure, 25 A.B.A.). 367, 371 
(1939)). 
Although a law fum may have more 
funds than an individual signer, the Court 
noted that the purpose of the sanction 
was punishment rather than reimburse-
ment. The Court also noted that the func-
tion "of Rule 11 as a whole is to bring 
home to the individual signer his per-
sonal, nondelegable responsibility." Id. 
at 460. Moreover, the Supreme Court 
determined that holding an individual 
signer personally liable provides a greater 
economic deterrent. Id. 
In a lone dissent, Justice Marshall ar-
gued that Rule 11 sanctions can apply to 
a law fum. At fIrst, the rule uses the term 
"signer," but later in its discussion of 
sanctions, the rule uses the phrase "the 
person who signed." Id. at 461 (Marshall, 
]., dissenting). The dissent noted that in 
the context of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, one could reasonably assume 
that the drafters meant the term "person" 
to include partnerships and professional 
corporations. Id. (Marshall, )., dissent-
ing) (citing 5 u.s.c. § 551 (2); NY. Part-
nership Law § 2 (McKinney 1988)). 
Recognizing that the sanction should be 
tailored to each situation, Justice Mar-
shall opined that Rule 11 allowed the trial 
judge to decide whether sanctions 
would more properly be applied to the 
attorney or his law fum. Id. at 462 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall rea-
soned that individual accountability may 
be heightened if an attorney's negligence 
also subjected his law fIrm to liability. Id. 
at 461-62 (Marshall,]., dissenting). 
In holding that Rule 11 sanctions apply 
only to the attorney who signs a paper in 
violation of the rule, the United States 
Supreme Court precluded the applica-
tion of Rule 11 sanctions to law firms. As 
a result, parties may fmd it more difficult 
to collect reimbursement for expenses 
caused by Rule 11 violations, but per-
sonal liability may provide a greater in-
centive for attorneys to comply with Rule 
11. 
-Richard E. Guida 
Simpler v. State: POllCE MAY NOT 
FRISK A SUSPECf AS A MATI'ER OF 
ROUI1NE CAIDlON, TIJERE MUST BE 
A REASONABLE SUSPIOON TIIAT 
THE SUSPECf IS ARMED AND DAN-
GEROUS 
In Simpler v. State, 318 Md. 311, 568 
A.2d 22 (1990) the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland held the seizure of parapherna-
lia with marijuana residue was unconsti-
tutional where the suspect was frisked 
without reasonable suspicion that he was 
armed and dangerous. 
On the evening of May 8, 1987, Ser-
geant Wassmer (Wassmer), of the Cecil 
County Sheriff's Department, and a 
young explorer scout were on routine 
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